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INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
The IMF’s Return to Iraq
Robert Looney
The International Monetary Fund has imposed its
traditional policies in Iraq. Few have considered the
consequences. But the author notes that business as
usual will probably not work in Iraq, and may well be
destructive. He also wonders why there is so little
imagination at the IMF.
DECEMBER 23, 2005, represented a landmark for Iraq. On thatday, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund(IMF) approved that institution’s first ever stand-by arrange-
ment (SBA) for Iraq. The new arrangement is designed to support
that nation’s economic program over the subsequent fifteen months.
The amount involved was 475.4 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
(about US$685 million). The SBA is expected to anchor macroeco-
nomic policy during this fifteen-month interval.
The stand-by arrangement represents Iraq’s second postwar loan
from the IMF. The first was undertaken under the IMF’s Emergency
Post Conflict Assistance facility and was granted in September 2004
to assist Iraq’s initial postwar recovery by supporting its economic
programs through 2005. Just as importantly, the arrangement was
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also intended to facilitate Iraq’s debt relief negotiations with its Paris
Club creditors (mainly the advanced industrial countries). Approval
of the stand-by agreement was a condition for a second stage of debt
reduction agreed upon by the Paris Club.1
From these developments it is clear that Iraq is looking to the Fund
to play an integral role in assisting its postwar recovery and eventual
return to solvency and self-reliance. Yet few international organiza-
tions are as controversial as the IMF. To some, the IMF offers strug-
gling countries the best means of reducing oppressive debt burdens
while at the same time obtaining sufficient funds to sustain programs
essential for sustained economic growth and development.
For others, the IMF, through its critical role in international debt
reduction, represents neocolonialism at its worst. As a recent observer
of the Iraqi case notes: “Post-Saddam Iraq offers a perfect illustration
of how the industrialized world has used debt as a tool to force devel-
oping nations to surrender sovereignty over their economies.”2
And another observes:
The IMF’s controversial strategy for aiding at-risk economies involves
manipulating weak nations into privatization and “structural adjust-
ment” plans favorable to foreign investors–—in this case largely as a
requirement of forgiving former dictator Saddam Hussein’s consider-
able international debt. Social movements the world over broadly
oppose such policies since they typically result in increased indebted-
ness and decreased living standards for the poor.3
Similar criticisms of the Fund’s sister organization, the World Bank,
have been advanced:
The World Bank has forced dozens of countries to put their economies
in the hands of the “free market”—achieved by eliminating regula-
tions and taxes and granting maximum flexibility to business and
investors. Its insistence on limiting the reach of government, and cre-
ating new ways to apply free-market principles to economies unaccus-
tomed to unbridled competition, has moved many observers to label
it a leading advocate of “market fundamentalism”—the ideological belief
that all economic problems can, and should, be solved with free-mar-
ket solutions. Now the World Bank is bringing its doctrines to Iraq.
The U.S. Government has acknowledged its concern that religious fun-
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damentalists might gain power in Iraq, but it has no problem with the
introduction of market fundamentalism.4
Are these valid concerns? Is Iraqi involvement with the Fund likely
to bring more instability than stability to that troubled country? While
it’s impossible at this point to provide definitive answers to these
questions, the sections below attempt to shed a little light on the
issue by examining the Fund’s initial efforts in Iraq.5 In particular,
are the Fund’s loans and associated programs likely, despite limited
Iraqi input and popular support, to provide the Iraqi economy with a
framework capable of generating a recovery and eventually moving
to sustained growth? If not, are there better alternatives?
The Policy Setting
Rough pictures of the harsh environment in which the Fund’s pro-
grams are being executed in Iraq are contained in that country’s Na-
tional Development Strategy (NDS). As the NDS notes, Saddam
Hussein’s economic legacy will be present for some time. In particu-
lar, that regime’s disastrous economic policies, together with politi-
cal repression, internal conflicts, wars, and sanctions, have left a
number of serious impediments to recovery and growth. While some
of these obstacles are lessening, thanks to the reforms put in place by
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),6 others were created or re-
inforced through subsequent postwar policy errors and miscalcula-
tions.7 The overall impact has been the creation of a number of serious
structural constraints on growth and development.8
1. The oil sector dominates the economy, accounting for around
74 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Iraq now depends
solely on oil exports for finance of investment and consump-
tion expenditures, for government revenues—of which oil ex-
port proceeds exceed 93 percent—and for 98 percent of foreign
currency earnings.
2. Centralized decision-making and intrusion of the state into eco-
nomic life have distorted the pricing structure in many sectors
to the extent that prices often do not reflect the real value of
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the product or service. In turn, distorted prices have caused
inefficiencies and waste.
3. The public sector is overrepresented in the economy, leading to
inefficiency and decreased growth. Many state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) are currently dormant. The weakness of the private sec-
tor has limited its role in economic development, increasing
the lack of diversification.
4. Social inequalities are widespread in a broad range of fields
covering health, education, public services, social services to
low-income groups, the disabled, internally displaced persons,
refugees, single-parent households, and other vulnerable groups,
across geographic areas.
5. With over 50 percent of the population under twenty-four years
of age, rapid rates of population growth are likely for many
years. Many in this large demographic group are alienated due
to violence and limited access to education, training, and ca-
reer prospects.
6. Widespread unemployment ranges up to 50 percent. In addi-
tion, more than 60 percent of the population depends on the
government’s rationed food basket. Unemployment has led to
an increase in demands for social assistance.
7. Poor governance practices are common, including widespread
nepotism in public appointments and corruption among pub-
lic servants. The lack of accountability and transparency in
managing state resources has abetted corruption and increased
its corrosive effect on growth and efficiency.
8. Iraq’s decades-long isolation has resulted in the digital divide,
with outdated institutions, administrative systems, and know-
how. Technological stagnation and the use of outmoded pro-
duction methods have weakened the economy as a whole.
9. Public-sector institutions have witnessed serious looting, theft,
and destruction.
10. The traditional family unit and the community have remained
the core of Iraqi society, ensuring solidarity and social cohe-
sion against all odds. However, conflict and inequality have
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eroded the social fabric of communities and families through-
out the past three decades.
11. In Iraq, social capital establishes an important relationship
between incomes and human capability to withstand shocks.
Iraqis have witnessed a depletion of social capital, which led to
social deprivation in most sectors of society.
12. Civic participation and recognition of human rights were de-
nied during the previous regime. They remain poorly under-
stood and lack ancillary support structures.
13. A large informal economy coexists with the formal sector. This
informal economy may account for as much as 65 percent of
gross domestic product.9 Even more worrisome is the large crimi-
nal element that controls large segments of the informal sector.10
A recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) house-
hold survey documents the impact these factors are having on the
average Iraqi household:11
1. The UNDP survey suggests that the poorest 20 percent of the
population earns 7 percent of the income, while the top 20
percent earns 44 percent.
2. Iraq’s median household income of $144 has dropped from a
postwar high of $255 in 2003.
3. One-third of Iraqis canvassed by UNDP described themselves
as being among the poor.
4. One-sixth of interviewees met all or most of the criteria sug-
gesting that they lived beneath the poverty line.
The IMF clearly recognizes the magnitude of the problem confront-
ing it in Iraq. In fact, the Fund has stressed the difficulty of implant-
ing policies in that country,12 especially in light of the constraints
imposed by the new, fragile, and very incomplete institutional set-
ting,13 the public sector’s limited administrative capacity, and the
precarious social, political, and security situation brought on by the
ongoing insurgency. The real question is: Are the Fund’s programs
capable of alleviating many of the adverse factors currently afflicting
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that country’s economy? Rather than directly attacking the country’s
many structural constraints to growth and recovery, the Fund sees its
main contribution in Iraq as one of supervising and facilitating the
conduct of sound macroeconomic policy, leading eventually to debt
relief through the Paris Club.
Issues Surrounding IMF Programs in Iraq
While an original charter member of the Fund, the country had had
little contact with the Washington-based organization during Saddam
Hussein’s reign. Iraq’s initial steps at restoring its relationship with
the IMF began in 2004. At that time, the interim government nomi-
nated a governor to represent the country at the Fund. Next Iraq settled
its arrears to the Fund (SDR55.3 million), while also consenting to an
increase in its Fund quota (raising it from SDR504.0 million to
SDR1.188 billion). Steps were also taken to clear Iraq’s arrears to the
World Bank and the Arab Monetary Fund. Finally, the authorities
began working with the country’s other external creditors toward the
resolution of its unsustainable external debt burden.14
With the groundwork laid, the Fund’s initial role in Iraq’s postwar
setting took shape on November 21, 2004. At that time, in a major
development on the debt front, the nineteen industrialized nations
that comprise the so-called Paris Club agreed to write off a portion of
Iraq’s debt in three stages. The first 30 percent, amounting to $11.6
billion, is to be written off unconditionally. A second 30 percent re-
duction will be delivered “as soon as a standard International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) program is approved.” A final 20 percent reduction
will be granted “upon completion of the last IMF board review of
three years of implementation of standard IMF programs.” In other
words, 30 percent of Iraqi debt will be excused only if the IMF and
Iraqi authorities agree on an economic “reform” package, and an-
other 20 percent will be written off only if the Fund is satisfied that
Iraq has implemented the terms of this package.15
As Paris Club members hold around $40 billion in Iraqi debt, Iraq
will still owe $7.78 billion to the Paris Club even if the IMF certifies
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its adherence to its specified conditionality requirements. If Iraq does
not satisfy the Fund, it will owe $27.16 billion to the group of nine-
teen industrialized nations.
The Emergency Post Conflict Assistance (EPCA) Program
As noted, a key element in the Paris Club accord was the stipulation
of Iraq’s undertaking and successfully completing a standard IMF
program. Given the country’s postwar state, together with the ongo-
ing insurgency, the Fund’s Emergency Post Conflict Assistance (EPCA)
program seemed the most appropriate choice.
EPCA-type programs have an interesting history. In 1962 the IMF
began providing emergency assistance to member countries afflicted
by natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and
droughts. This assistance is aimed at meeting immediate foreign ex-
change financing needs arising from, for example, shortfalls in ex-
port earnings or increased imports. A prime consideration underlying
this type of loan is avoiding a serious depletion of external reserves.16
In 1995, the IMF’s emergency assistance facility was expanded to
cover countries in post-conflict situations. This assistance is limited
to circumstances where a member with an urgent balance-of-pay-
ments need is unable to develop and implement a comprehensive
economic program because its capacity has been damaged by a con-
flict, but where sufficient capacity for planning and policy imple-
mentation nevertheless exists. In these circumstances IMF financing
can help a country directly with the infusion of funding and indi-
rectly by catalyzing support from other sources.17
For its part, the Iraqi government pledged to develop a comprehensive
economic and financial program with the Fund, stressing the need to:
1. Increase the price of petroleum products.
2. Make monetary policy more adaptable by widening the num-
ber of instruments for managing liquidity conditions.
3. Undertake structural reforms with regard to: (a) tax administra-
tion, (b) payments and settlements systems, (c) state-owned
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enterprise restructuring, and (d) governance and transparency
in the oil sector.18
The EPCA was difficult to implement and its progress hard to
assess. In part these difficulties stemmed from the lack of accurate
and timely statistical data. With these caveats in mind, the program
produced mixed results. By the summer of 2005 the Fund was ex-
pressing concern over the slow pace of reform implementation and
that the country was not strictly adhering to the terms of the EPCA.
Specifically:
1. The IMF estimated GDP growth of about 50 percent in 2004,
following several years of contraction. For 2005 the IMF esti-
mated that growth slowed to around 2.6 percent (against an
initial EPCA program target of 17 percent, which was later re-
vised down to 3.7 percent) as a result of lower-than-expected
oil production caused by the ongoing insurgency.
2. Inflation in 2004 was estimated at 20 percent against an EPCA
target, with prices remaining volatile.
3. On the other hand, the fiscal deficit in 2005 was expected to be
about half what was projected under the EPCA program. How-
ever, this would only occur if oil prices were higher than ex-
pected. Oil production remained flat at around 2.0 million
barrels per day—approximately the average achieved in 2002.
From the Fund’s perspective, the major area of deficiency under
the EPCA program was the reluctance of Iraqi officials to increase
domestic prices of refined oil products. Under the EPCA timeline,
the Iraqi authorities were supposed to have begun the adjustment of
domestic prices by the end of 2004. This did not occur, and by mid-
2005, gasoline prices in the black market had risen to very high levels
with the authorities continuing to supply gasoline locally at heavily
subsidized prices—less than US$0.02 per liter (US$0.05 per U.S. gal-
lon), one of the lowest prices in the world, even though local refiner-
ies were unable to keep up with demand. Prices were several times
higher in neighboring oil states such as Kuwait and Iran, while the
Looney
34 Challenge/May–June 2006
price differential with Turkey may on occasion have been as much as
ten times greater.
As might be imagined from elementary economic theory, the low
price of gasoline produced both shortages and thriving black markets.
To ease the shortages, Iraq, a country with the world’s third largest
crude oil reserves, spent US$3.2 billion in 2004 on imports of petro-
leum products, mostly gasoline.19 Ironically, much of the imported
petroleum products had originated in Iraq only to be smuggled out of
the country to take advantage of the Iraq/external price differential.
The cost of buying from neighboring countries is magnified by
rampant export smuggling, with a steady stream of subsidized gaso-
line flowing back out of the same countries where the government
bought it. Black-market fuel dealers, offering a faster alternative to
queuing at the pumps, exploit the artificial price gap. The insurgency
is also heavily involved in black market arbitrage. A gas station owner
selling a tankerload of gasoline at the official price could expect to
make about $340 in profit, while selling the same gas on the black
market would net more than $4,800.20 The resulting revenue loss in
the government budget was as much as US$8 billion or 30 percent of
GDP in 2004.21
While the economic solution to smuggling and black markets is
rather straightforward—simply let the price of gasoline be determined
by market forces—there is considerable opposition to this in Iraq.
Iraqis mired in poverty have become too dependent on cheap fuel,
with many arguing that Saddam Hussein always produced enough
gasoline to meet local demand, even during the thirteen-year period
of UN-imposed sanctions.
Less obvious to many is the fact that since the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein, dramatic shifts in fuel supply and demand have taken place.
Fuel demand has risen at a much faster rate than anyone anticipated,
whereas on the supply side refineries have been strapped by pipeline
stoppages and electricity outages. There has also been an explosion
of cars coming into the country. These have resulted in an estimated
1 million more vehicles on Iraqi roads. With the electricity grid down
about half the time, home generators put a further drain on fuel
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supplies. The rising use of air conditioners has only compounded the
problem. Before the war, Iraqis used 4 million gallons of gasoline a
day. By 2005 that number had surged to 6 million gallons a day.22
Under these circumstances, it would seem that only a new pricing
strategy will help to curb wasteful fuel use, thus bringing supply and
demand into balance.23 There is little popular support in Iraq for this
“economic” solution. Iraqi politicians always looking toward the next
election are reluctant to touch gasoline prices, a basic welfare issue
that could trump sectarian loyalties. A typical political response to
proposed price increases is that fuel subsidies must be maintained
“until the people’s financial situation is better.” To this the IMF would
no doubt respond by pointing out that “damaging market distortions”
caused by subsidies are at the root of Iraq’s economic problems, and
there is no time like the present to liberalize the current system.24
The Iraqi government has tried to avoid price increases through
various initiatives designed to decrease local consumption. One plan
ordered drivers to leave their cars at home on alternating days based
on odd- or even-numbered license plates. But as might be imagined,
the rule was hard to enforce, with many drivers reportedly using two
sets of plates and switching them daily to avoid the heavy noncom-
pliance fine.25
Another attempt at a nonprice solution to the country’s fuel prob-
lems was the introduction of a ration card system. Such a system has
been in operation for buying gasoline in Kirkuk and Iraqi Kurdistan
for most of 2005. In September 2005, rationing was introduced in the
rest of Iraq for the purchase of kerosene and cooking gas, using the
existing food ration system. By October the use of ration cards had
extended to the purchase of gasoline as well. This program also was
unpopular, with the chief complaints that the coupons were not be-
ing equitably distributed, that “gangs” with connections to the Min-
istry of Oil officials were trading actively in the black market, that
there were still long queues at petrol stations, and that the coupons
were late in arriving.26
Finally toward the end of 2005, under pressure from the IMF and
facing mounting opposition to nonprice solutions, the Iraqi cabinet
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agreed to raise the price of petroleum and petroleum derivatives by
between 100 percent and 200 percent. This would bring the price per
liter for regular gasoline to 50 dinars and for refined gasoline to 150
dinars, in addition to price increases for other derivatives of white
petroleum and liquefied gas.27 This was meant to be the first in a
series of increases over the course of 2006 designed to raise the
price of fuel to the average in Persian Gulf states—about 93 cents
per gallon.28
Although the decision to raise gas prices had been made in Octo-
ber, it was not announced until December 18, several days after the
national election. In addition, the price increases went into effect
immediately rather than in early January as originally planned. There
were immediate protests across the country with several governate
councils—Basra, Karbala, Dhi Qar, and Maysan assemblies—declaring
their intention to disregard the edict.
The price increase was greeted with general criticism from the
media, with statements of support limited to some, but not all, of the
papers associated with the ruling Unified Iraqi Coalition. The major-
ity of sources indicated that the government had failed to provide a
convincing account of why the increase was necessary.29
Finally, a December 22 statement from the Council of Ministers
explained that the increase would reduce the costs of Iraq’s interna-
tional debts and fuel subsidies, while at the same time serving as a
disincentive for smugglers. As Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’fari noted:
“We faced a tough decision. They [the IMF] are not willing to help a
country that squanders its wealth, as they put it.”30 The Council as-
sured that the extra revenue derived from the price increases would be
used to support “a million poor families and the oil industry’s infra-
structure”—the added revenue from the sale of higher priced gasoline
was to be put into a fund to assist very low-income families.
Clearly the fuel price increases were undertaken largely to qualify
for the next phase of IMF lending. However, a very good economic
case can be made that the price reforms were clearly in the govern-
ment and country’s best interest. A recent World Bank analysis of the
country’s domestic fuel markets concluded that black market prices
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average ten to forty times above the official ones.31 The Bank’s econo-
metric simulations suggested that a sixfold increase in fuel prices
would lead to a 16 percent decline in fuel imports and a 30 percent
decline in black market sales. Government savings would amount to
about $1.73 billion, allowing for additional investment or compen-
sation to households.
However, the resistance met by the government’s December 18,
2005, decision to increase fuel prices raises question about Baghdad’s
ability to undertake economic reforms in the face of popular and
provincial opposition. That the government was not able to make a
convincing case to the public on such an obviously beneficial policy
raises serious doubts about the future of economic reform in Iraq
and the ability of the IMF to assist in advancing the country’s re-
entry into the global economy.
The Stand-By Loan
Despite the difficulties encountered by the Iraqi authorities in press-
ing ahead with fuel price deregulation, a key aspect of the EPCA, the
country received a favorable evaluation from the IMF. Takatoshi Kato,
the Fund’s deputy managing director, noted: “The Iraqi authorities
were successful in promoting macroeconomic stability in 2005, de-
spite the extremely difficult security environment.”32 As with all IMF
programs, the stand-by arrangement signed on December 23, 2005,
sets a number of performance criteria (see Table 1). These include:
1. A floor on net international reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq
(CBI).
2. A ceiling on lending to the government and the private sector
by the CBI.
3. A ceiling on the primary deficit of the government.
4. A ceiling on the government wage and pension bill.
5. A floor on the revenue of oil-related state-owned enterprises,
including those remitted to the budget.
6. A ceiling on external arrears on new borrowing.
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7. A ceiling on contracting and guaranteeing of new medium- and
long-term concessional external debt.
8. A ceiling on government imports of petroleum products.
Ultimately, the success of the program rests on meeting the program’s
targets, which in turn depends in large part on favorable developments
in the oil sector. If these conditions are met, the IMF anticipates an
increase in economic growth in 2006, with a continuation in the re-
duction of inflation. As for the oil sector, after stalling at 2.10 million
barrels per day (mbd) in 2005, it is hoped oil production will expand
during 2006, reaching 2.3 mbd by the end of the year. If this occurs,
non-oil economic growth may reach 8 percent, with overall GDP growth
increasing from 2.6 percent in 2005 to 10.4 percent in 2006. The infla-
tion rate is expected to fall to 15 percent by the end of 2006.
The IMF program envisions that the country’s fiscal position will
be driven by the ongoing reconstruction program, subject to financ-
ing constraint. As events have unfolded, the country’s anticipated rev-
enues have had to be revised numerous times. Despite the high degree
of uncertainty over future sources of revenues, the Fund has an opti-
mistic outlook, projecting the 2006 fiscal deficit at 8.2 percent of GDP
following a deficit of 10.8 percent of GDP in 2005. For the medium
term out to 2010, the Fund sees construction needs subsiding and the
government’s fiscal deficit gradually declining toward zero.
In the monetary area, the Fund sees a continuation of the de facto
peg of the Iraqi dinar to the U.S. dollar. With the stipulation of the
program’s target of no net domestic credit creation, net international
reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) should continue to increase
by some $1.7 billion to $10 billion by the end of 2006.
Assessment
As in most developing countries, the Fund’s role in Iraq has been
controversial. It has been an easy target for critics’ claims that its
programs are more in the interest of the larger industrial countries
than that of the host country. In Iraq’s case, a variant of this theme











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































suggests that “In their proposals to write off some of the debt, the
Paris Club members took advantage of the opportunity to impose
conditions that could bind the successor government in Baghdad to
policies of free-market fundamentalism.”33
Another line of criticism contends that IMF-type programs stress-
ing free markets, deregulation, and privatization are simply not ap-
propriate for many countries, especially those going through a difficult
transition. Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz has repeatedly stressed
that when applied to countries like Russia in the 1990s, many pro-
grams similar to the ones introduced to Iraq have caused disastrous
results—in the Russian case, a decline in GDP by 50 percent and an
increase in the poverty level from 2 percent to more than 20 percent
following the introduction of IMF programs.
Elsewhere Stiglitz has suggested that while, in theory, IMF sup-
ports democratic institutions in the nations it assists, in actual prac-
tice it often undermines this process through its policies.34 In Iraq’s
case, freeing fuel prices is arguably good economics, but it is not
something an elected government wanted to do—certainly there was
no grassroots support for such a shift in policy. The growing discon-
tent in Iraq brought on by higher gas prices is only adding one more
stress to an already fragile system.
Related to this is the timing of the stand-by agreement. This pro-
gram was consummated without any input from a newly elected gov-
ernment. Yet this new government will have to meet its conditions
and live with its consequences. All the Fund had to do was wait a
month or so to deal directly with the new government. Most likely
the chances of the stand-by agreement’s success would have increased
if the new government had a direct input to the agreement. As Profes-
sor Feldman has noted, “The IMF or the World Bank are in a position
to impose certain conditions. . . . [but] we have seen this throughout
the world, that various decisions that the government needs to take
tend to have more buy-in from the public if they are perceived as
having been made domestically rather than imposed by the interna-
tional organizations.”35
In sum, as is the situation in most of the countries in which it is
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active, the IMF program is not based on popular support but instead
relies on a small group of technocrats for its implementation. How-
ever, the Iraqi technocrats who negotiated the SBA may not be in a
position to assist in implementing the program. There is every sign
that the newly elected (December 2005) Shia-dominated government
will not be receptive to the liberal economic blueprint advanced by
the IMF. As a leading business publication noted: “We remain con-
cerned that political interference and cronyism in Baghdad from the
incoming Iraqi government could significantly ‘crowd out’ efforts by
the very affluent expatriate Iraqi private sector to develop significant
parts of the Iraqi economy because of bureaucracy and unnecessary
involvement by the national government.”36
Possible future legislation proposed by the Ministry of the Inte-
rior in a December 26, 2005, memo suggests a high likelihood
that the new Iraqi government, should it survive, will pursue a
course of action directly at odds with the IMF’s intent to create a
climate conducive to private domestic investment complemented
by large flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Specifically the
ministry proposes:37
1. All contracts would be issued only to Iraqi contractors.
2. No international companies would be permitted to register in
Iraq without proof of residency.
3. Restricted access of non-Iraqi international or Arabic-speaking
people to Iraq.
4. Creation of a commission called the Investment Promotion
Agency with responsibility for overseeing all foreign investment
in Iraq, coordinated through nineteen government ministries.
5. No U.S. dollar accounts to be permitted in Iraq; all accounts to
be in Iraqi dinars.
6. All ministry accounts to be centralized.
Clearly, security is one consideration behind these measures. How-
ever, each of these measures has the potential to be quite protection-
ist. If any or all are implemented, the outcome would likely lead to
increasing opportunities for corruption and have a significantly nega-
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tive impact on the economy’s transition to a relatively free market
environment.
The Iraqi trade unions are also advancing an agenda sharply at odds
with the IMF. This group stresses that the policies of the IMF and
World Bank in Iraq should:38
1. Increase transparency and provide representation for Iraq in the
decision-making structures of International Financial Institutions.
2. Stop imposing structural adjustment conditions for loans.
3. Agree to provide funding for public services and state-owned
enterprises without demanding their privatization.
4. Cancel debts owed by Iraq that have resulted from the policies
of the former regime.
5. Reject the reduction of spending on social services, especially
the elimination of government support for the food distribu-
tion system or the reduction in the number of items covered.
6. Strongly reject the privatization of publicly owned entities and
especially of the oil, education, health, electricity, transporta-
tion, and construction sectors.
7. Adopt a new labor law and a pension and social security law
that ensure workers’ rights and are in conformity with interna-
tional labor standards and human rights conventions. The World
Bank and the IMF must also respect these standards.
While this program may be unrealistic considering Iraq’s debt situ-
ation, it does convey a widespread popular sentiment that could
quickly turn into broad-based resistance to the IMF’s efforts in Iraq.
In this case, the IMF might also lose international support, because it
is clear there are alternative programs that have a much greater chance
of succeeding in the Iraqi context.
One such program is the innovative oil fund approach put forward
by Thomas Palley.39 He has suggested that a fairly high percentage of
Iraq’s oil revenues be placed in a fund for direct distribution to the
population. In addition to the obvious popularity of a direct distri-
bution fund, its great strength lies in the prospect of the establish-
ment of a virtuous circle of demand-led growth as opposed to the
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current economic malaise or even by some accounts a vicious circle
of unemployment, increased recruits into the insurgency, and fur-
ther postponement of private-sector investment, followed by more
unemployment. Most importantly, by breaking the direct link be-
tween oil and the government, this approach holds out the distinct
prospect of enabling Iraq to avoid the oil curse that has plagued so
many resource-rich developing countries.40 In addition, there would
be many tangible benefits associated with a disbursal program of
this type, each of which can play an important role in the country’s
recovery:
1. The Iraqi people would have increased incentive to protect
the country’s oil facilities by providing intelligence on insur-
gent groups attempting to disrupt the production and flow of
oil.41
2. It might even help stem the insurgency, especially if much of
that activity is driven by Sunni fears that they will receive
considerably less than their accustomed amount under the new
constitution.
3. Men and women would receive equal distributions.
4. It would establish an irrevocable personal identity under the
law—essential for establishing titled property rights, bank ac-
counts, human rights protection, voter lists, and taxpayer lists.
5. It would expand banking and credit access for small and me-
dium business.
6. It could help offset pubic resistance to gas price increases that
will be needed to cut back oil smuggling. A related benefit is
that it would also greatly help the government cut back on gas
subsidies, which currently amount to billions of dollars a year.
7. Without equitable distribution of oil revenues, competition
among various groups for oil money could turn ugly, and even
erupt into violent conflict in Iraq. Rifts over oil revenues al-
ready run deep, as Iraqi Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen struggle for
control of oil-rich Kirkuk.42
8. Citizens eligible for fund payouts would have an incentive to
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monitor the government and participate in the political pro-
cess to guard the value of their entitlement.
9. A related effect is that oil funds are likely to encourage effi-
ciency in the petroleum sector. Since the size of payments to
citizens will depend on the efficiency of the oil industry, this
should contribute to political pressure to improve efficiency.
10. Oil funds are expedient—rather than the long time intervals
needed to improve government accountability and anti-corrup-
tion drives, they can be put in place immediately. They are dou-
bly desirable when governance is weak and the need for
institutions to handle oil revenues is immediate.
Reading the recent IMF documents on Iraq, one is struck by their
lack of creativity. No innovative programs such as Palley’s are put
forth or even discussed. The program is pure fiscal austerity in a coun-
try where the real unemployment rate may approach 50 percent43
and the performance of Iraq’s infrastructure has fallen below pre-
war levels.44
Where the Fund can be especially faulted is in its approach to the
short run. What seems to be lacking in the IMF programs in Iraq is
the acknowledgment that there might be some sort of linkage be-
tween their program and the insurgency. Are the IMF goals optimal
in terms of extinguishing the insurgency, or might other strategies
be more effective in this regard? Critical issues in this area are not
even mentioned, let alone addressed in any systematic manner.
Given the unlikelihood that investors will flock to Iraq any time
soon, is monetary and fiscal discipline at apparently any cost a worth-
while goal? Might not stepped-up government expenditures and job
creation create a more stable short- to medium-term environment? It
is as if the Fund were writing a program for an oil-rich transition
country like Azerbaijan rather than a war-torn country with an ongo-
ing insurgency.
One cannot help come away with the feeling that the Fund is under
tremendous pressure (most likely from the United States and the UK)
to become involved in Iraq. They moved ahead with the stand-by agree-
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ment when they could have easily cited noncompliance with the terms
of the EPCA as the reason for terminating their stay in Iraq. As it stands,
they have very little leverage over the Iraqis, who can always blame
some sort of crisis for suboptimal performance. Under these circum-
stances, an unconventional approach was certainly worth a try.
To make the most of their efforts in Iraq, the Fund would be well
advised to listen carefully to Iraqi concerns. As one distinguished
Iraqi economist has observed, “When I look at past IMF policy er-
rors, I get frightened. Iraq stands no chance of success if the IMF
makes policies like those it made in the past.”45
An earlier essay, written in the summer of 2003 and before the
insurgency started taking its toll, concluded that:
The reality is that Iraq is bankrupt. Even under fairly optimistic debt
restructuring and oil revenue assumptions, it will simply not have the
resources to implement a successful reconstruction and recovery pro-
gram. While the country would likely be able to thrive under an inter-
national aid program as ambitious as the Marshall Plan that helped
Europe recover from the ravages of World War II, there is no indica-
tion that donor countries are lining up to provide funds of this magni-
tude. No doubt significant amounts of aid funds, both humanitarian
and development, will flow into Iraq, but these will be far short of the
likely budgetary requirements needed to put Iraq’s economy on a
steady, self-sustained growth path.46
Sadly, this conclusion still holds today, with the IMF programs in
Iraq doing little to change the basic situation. In fact, one can easily
argue that the Fund has only added more stress to an already over-
burdened situation.
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